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The paradoxical nature of modernity as being embedded in institutional and 
cultural developments in history has been noted by many scholars. In that sense, 
it can be said that modernity has both bright and dark sides. Not only in the 
West, but also in Asia, the paradoxical nature of modernity has made people pay 
attention to communitarian alternatives to liberalism combined with modernity. 
By the way, two types of communitarianism can be discerned. One is more or less 
authoritarian, whilst the other democratic and participatory. In this paper, the 
latter type of communitarianism is called 'neo-communitarianism,' which has been 
expressed in such recent experiences in South Korea as NGO's participation in 
the 2000 General Election, soccer team supporters in the 2002 World Cup Games, 
the 2002 presidential election, and the emergence of the 386 generation as a 
self-conscious political agency which pursue participation and democracy by the 
help of the Internet.
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Discourses of modernity are abundant. Many distinguished scholars 
with diverse intellectual backgrounds have engaged in an attempt to 
criticize the fundamental deficiencies of Western modernity. What 
comes out of this systematic confrontation with the Western tradition of 
enlightenment and modernity, however, is far from being uniform. On 
the contrary, the proposed solutions are so divergent that one is liable 
to end up highly confused. For instance, conflicting philosophical 
positions with such labels as deconstruction, post-modernism, 
late-modernity, contextualism, multiculturalism, and so on have been 
declared and are busy contesting each other. Meanwhile, the idea of 
“multiple modernities” has become quite popular among sociologists 
and historians, amongst others, sensitizing us to the role of traditions in 
the process of modernization. Consequently, discourses of modernity 
have become rich in historical substance, embracing diversity when 
interpreting the patterns of mediation between modern and traditional 
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institutions and values. This already implies that modernity in its 
concrete existence is always historical and hence cannot be reduced to 
any unmediated essence. Furthermore, it has been persuasively argued 
that Western modernity, however instrumental and destructive it has 
turned out to be in history, still carries within itself an unfinished 
normative project towards an enlightenment-oriented moral-ethical and 
aesthetic deliberation. Much care is needed when we talk about 
modernity.
With such complexity in mind, however, I would like to take up a 
straightforward social-scientific perspective (rather than a philosophical 
one) and examine why and how the promise and the peril of modernity 
arise. This holds true not only in the West but also in the East where 
the enthusiasm of catch-up modernization prevails. I shall try to be as 
simple as I can in focusing on the paradoxical nature of modernity as 
being deeply embedded in the following institutional and cultural 
developments, which can be summarized by ten points.
 
TEN POINTS OF PARADOXICAL MODERNITY
1) Modernity has been deeply associated with the rise of nation states. 
Nevertheless, the idea of territorial sovereignty itself was not new. What 
has made modernity distinctive was the fact that political, economic and 
socio-cultural integration was made possible by the expansion of 
citizenship, and not through the imposition of feudal, class or tribal 
identities. It is in this sense that we can say that modernity has a very 
fundamental connection to the establishment of nation states, in turn 
opening up a new age of competition and cooperation among citizens. 
This holds as true in the East as it does in the West. However, 
significant changes have recently taken place in the direction of social 
transformation as we move ever further into the age of globalization. 
Knowledge, information, and capital move across borders freely, and 
the steady expansion of the network of global communication via 
satellite and the Internet has had a transformative effect on our sense 
of time and space. Against the background of such changes, the role of 
the state seems to be under siege. This is particularly so when a country 
remains highly dependent on, and thus vulnerable to, external 
conditions. The movement of international capital, for example, seems 
to be too macroscopic and unpredictable for individual countries to 
control effectively. Existing modes of resolving conflict within the 
institutions of nation states and the existing international system no 
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longer suffice given the tendency of globalization to make heighten 
disparities and tensions betwixt and between countries and peoples 
everywhere.
2) Modernity means industrialization everywhere and hence invites 
the rise of the labor movement. As industries spread all over the 
country, the workers become the largest collectivity in terms of number 
and the potential capacity of action. Since labor issues have tended to 
stand at the forefront of social conflicts awakened by modernity, the 
ideological and political landscape has been powerfully shaped by the 
competition between the left and the right. In the Western world, 
especially in Europe, industrial labor conflicts gave rise to the social 
democratic parties that made a great contribution to the establishment 
of the welfare state. There is no doubt that the welfare state has meant 
an important progression for a mankind attempting to constructively 
combine the ideas of freedom and equality, or productivity and welfare. 
The situation, however, is now in flux. The period marked by left-right 
confrontation is now largely gone and the welfare state is under siege, 
even in cradles of social democracy such as Scandinavia. More often 
than not, the labor movement and left-wing organizations appear to be 
rigid, power-oriented, preoccupied with securing their narrow group 
interests withoutpaying enough attention to other pertinent issues such 
as the environment, rights of minorities, various risks imposed on 
ordinary citizens, and so on. It is questionable, therefore, whether the 
labor movement can still be considered as the shining symbol of human 
emancipation as it was in the past. 
3) Characteristic of modernity is the expansion of the bureaucratic 
regulation of human interaction and the role of professional experts. 
The rule of law is also constitutive of bureaucratic regulation, 
facilitating an efficient hierarchical control from above. As Max Weber 
has succinctly argued, the process of bureaucratization plays an integral 
role in the generalization of a comportment towards the world 
characterized by rationality and efficiency. Not only the administration 
of the state and business corporations, but also labor itself became 
increasingly organized along these lines, as can be seen in the giant 
factory. But here too fundamental changes are taking place today. 
Bureaucratic organization is relatively slow to adapt to changes in the 
environment and thus more costly in comparative terms hence it is 
commonly regarded these days as being contrary to principles of 
rationality and efficiency, posing obstacles to participation and creativity 
and leading to a general atmosphere of alienation and powerlessness. In 
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the age of the knowledge-based economy, the once ascendant paradigm 
of bureaucratic rationality turns out to be detrimental to human 
prosperity, cooperation and wellbeing.
Consequently, post-bureaucratic reforms have been sought from many 
directions. The concept of team-work bringing with it an emphasis on 
collective responsibility, autonomous decision-making, and continuous 
learning has been brought into institutions together with those of 
flexible modes of production, ongoing human resource development, 
and empowerment. In addition to communication by means of a 
hierarchical ‘top-down’ command structure, more emphasis is being 
placed on ‘bottom-up’ communication from the lower echelons of an 
organization to the top rungs, as well as horizontal communication 
among various components of the organization. This means that 
unbridled faith in the superiority of bureaucratic rationality as a key 
element of modernity has largely faded away, while the need for 
decentralized and yet consensually oriented forms for the structuring of 
organizations is keenly felt everywhere. 
4) Modernity has been synonymous with a specific civilizational form 
in which science and technology reign supreme. A seemingly boundless 
faith in science and technology has been a hallmark of the modernist 
mentality. Science has been exulted not only as the most important 
means for procuring productivity but also as the driving force for the 
liberation of mankind. Science encourages the pursuit of rationality and 
progress. Yet here too changes are obvious: increasingly, there is a 
widespread disillusionment with the subjugating nature of scientific 
civilization. Although science has contributed in countless ways to 
human happiness and welfare, it is high time that science also take 
some responsibility for the increasingly numerous misfortunes and 
disasters befalling mankind, such as can be seen from the enormous 
damage wrought by the wholesale destruction of the environment and 
the carnage of war spread through the use of weapons of mass 
destruction. Furthermore, the scientific mentality tends to narrow the 
horizon available for human emancipation by subjugating normative 
concerns to those of technical management, in the process delegating to 
secondary place the increasingly desperate call of the moral-ethical, 
emotive, and aesthetic dimensions of human life. Thus, we can no 
longer with a clear conscience subscribe to the myth that science is 
identical to progress and emancipation.
5) Another distinctive trait of modernity is its tendency to reinforce 
a movement towards representative democracy. Political parties and 
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parliaments have been hailed as “the flower of representative 
democracy.” It must be pointed out, however, that there is at present 
a surprisingly high degree of dissatisfaction over and mistrust for 
institutional politics among the ordinary populace. The rate of 
participation in polls by registered voters is alarmingly low in both East 
Asia and the West. Politics is widely deemed to be easily corruptible, 
and under the sway of powerful lobbies for sundry self-motivated 
interests. In spite of the existence and institutionalization of the 
structural forms for the exercise of popular choice in the form of 
elections, ‘real politics’ is widely written off as being manipulated 
behind the scenes by sinister forces. Consequently, voters are now 
seeking ways to participate in a more direct manner (for instance 
town-hall meetings, plebiscites, referendums, and ballot initiatives as in, 
say, Swiss cantons, and also in California). Innovations in Internet 
communication and e-government are fuelling these initiatives on the 
part of the masses. As a landmark of modernity, representative 
democracy now faces the challenge of answering the call of 
‘anti-politics’ from all quarters, reflecting the general apathy and 
cynicism of the people everywhere. 
6) The modern family system is the nuclear family. The family has 
traditionally been regarded as the last bastion of an order with even 
some semblance of humanity. No matter how much change a society 
underwent, it was assumed that the family would firmly anchor the 
highest ideals of a society, in the process providing the basis for 
stability. Today, however, tremendous changes are taking place even in 
this most private of spheres. This is because the age-old relationship 
between the two sexes ― love, marriage and the institution of the family 
based on it ― has been undergoing a fundamental transformation. The 
divorce rate is climbing by the day and thereis a noticeable increase in 
the number of both divorced and never-married single mothers. In some 
countries, furthermore, homosexual marriages have been legalized. 
These may be seen as unintended consequences of women’s 
emancipation. However, a balanced view is needed to see clearly the 
impacts of risks placed upon the life of the concerned individuals. The 
state has been largely powerless to control the unfolding of these 
developments. That the number of youths who spend their childhood 
under the same set of parents is steadily decreasing is indicative of an 
enormous shift in the wider society, a shift that shakes an individual's 
sense of order to its foundations. A serious question in this context is 
whether and to what extent the East Asian countries should follow the 
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Western road to paradoxical modernity.
7) Modernity has meant the transformation of human relationships, 
freeing them from the bondage of traditional status based distinctions 
andintroducing a new and more flexible system of social relationships 
and contracts providing increased social mobility as well as security and 
life-long employment. Social relationships uprooted through the process 
of transition from tradition to modernity once again attained an element 
of stability with the spread of the standard ‘social mooring points’ of 
modern society, such as occupation, class, sexuality, and so on. It was 
expected that the vast majority of people tread a fixed course of life 
once they take on a particular occupation or enter into the labor market. 
The stability of expectations and accountability was made possible on 
this basis. Gradually, however, society is once again becoming more 
‘fluid’ with the disappearance of the idée fixe; it has been pointed out 
that our future lives will seem more ‘nomadic’ as people diversify their 
knowledge, tastes, and inclinations. People are becoming freer than at 
any other time in history to enter or leave various jobs as they see fit. 
Thus, the stability of the infrastructure of life under modernity in terms 
of occupation and social positioning is significantly decreasing and 
tends to be replaced by increased uncertainty and fluidity.
8) Modernity entails a sharp distinction between the private and the 
public, on the one hand, and between exchange value and use value, 
on the other. The market necessitates rational computation and a cold 
money-minded calculation of one’s self-interest. The exchange value of 
a thing is held to be more important than the value of its inherent 
utility. Everything is reckoned in terms of money value or else 
calculated in accordance with an index that offers some standard of 
measurement. For this reason, women, who value the emotional and 
relational aspects of life more than men, have been forcibly relegated to 
remaining in the private and personal (as opposed to the public) realm 
in the society. 
Here too the times are changing such that women are now actively 
resisting the notion of a fundamental division between the private and 
the public spheres as well as the assumed essential division between the 
male and the female sex, in the process challenging the tendency of 
phallocentric thinking to subjugate the human and non-human 
environment around it and impose its own mode of instrumental 
rationality. The various voices representing hitherto repressed feelings 
and sentiments, desires and aesthetic experiences are all speaking out, 
sometimes loudly and aggressively. Modernity characterized by male 
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domination in terms of formal and instrumental rationality faces today 
serious challenges.
9) Modernity fosters functional specialization and differentiation, as 
systems theory well describes. We can say that modernity was 
originally marked by the differentiation into the spheres of science, 
morality, law, and arts, a weltanschauung that was once unified by 
religion. Society has since then evolved in an even more specialized and 
differentiated fashion. Countless types of professions, functions, 
industries, organizations and systems of knowledge have emerged 
anew. A flood of information is being released and circulated in line 
with the distinct modes of choice and classification that belong to each 
category. Along with the process of differentiation, however, new 
counter-trends emerge calling for re-integration, recombination, and 
de-differentiation out of which new syntheses, fusions, hybrids, 
mutations, and so on are made possible. The fields of genetic 
engineering, the life sciences and the information industry are good 
examples of this new trend as much as are the various kinds of 
destructive restructuring of business corporations. The products of 
hybridity, mimesis, and fusion can be easily found in the realms of 
music and the arts, above all. 
10) Originating from the idea of individual freedom and sovereignty, 
modernity has witnessed the constant expansion of individual choices 
and self-determination. Communism, which refused to admit individual 
freedom, autonomy, and democracy has fallen. The theory of human 
rights, which entails the notion of human beings as possessing natural 
rights that no one can take away, is now universally accepted. On the 
other hand, it is also true that the freedom and choice of the individual 
has grown out of all proportion with its relationship to individual and 
collective responsibility and duty, giving rise to numerous pathological 
consequences. The idea of the community is collapsing, with the 
consequence that age-old virtues such as consideration of others and an 
ethic of caring are weakened. Among the negative side effects are the 
surge of materialistic values, a self-centered egoism of various kinds, 
drug use, violent crime, and corruption. Thus, there has emerged a 
deep need to reconcile the individual and communitarian aspects of 
human rights, human responsibility, and human well-being. As the 
saying goes, the pathological phenomenon of “too much individual 
freedom” has been a bane for modern man.
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LIBERALISM AND COMMUNITARIANISM 
The paradoxical nature of modernity is as conspicuous to us in the 
East as it is to those in Western societies. China and Korea are no 
exceptions. Due to the rapid-paced progress of catch-up modernization 
that has occurred in these two countries (a phenomena that is possibly 
unprecedented in world history), the dark side of modernity (bringing 
with it an increased incidence of risk) is deeper and more sharply 
defined here than it is in other regions of the world. We here in East 
Asia must be quite honest to ourselves in focusing our attention to this 
fact.
In this context, it is necessary to draw attention to the communitarian 
attempts to overcome the deficiencies of an anthropocentric modernity 
by emphasizing the value of collective goods and interests to be 
preserved for the benefit of future generations. This issue is important 
to us as East Asians, since many problems of Western modernity stem 
from an undue emphasis on, and preoccupation with individuality as a 
core value of modernity, which is at odds with the socially embedded 
nature of human life. Thus, one of the key questions we need to raise 
is how to cultivate and re-establish a communitarian Weltanschauung 
and orientation in a balanced manner so that, with this as a basis we 
might pursue a dialogue with the west at the same time as advocating 
neither relativism nor fundamentalism but a more encompassing 
perspective firmly footed on our cultural traditions. This brings us to 
the well-known debate between liberal and communitarian streams of 
political thought. 
The leading principle of liberalism lies in the concept of the 
individual sovereignty, which means that individuals are equally 
entitled to pursue their interests freely as long as their actions and 
expressions do not harm others. According to this position, “each is 
equal as a moral being and should enjoy substantial personal 
independence immune from coercion by the will of others” (Nagel, 
1995: 94). As far as the concept of sovereignty is concerned, the same 
logic is applied to state and individuals alike: “Just as a sovereign state 
rules over its territory, onto which no other state can trespass, a 
sovereign individual rules his or her own life and action so long as the 
actions do not harm others” (Chan, 1999: 231). According to versions of 
strict liberalism, individual sovereignty is as comprehensive as state 
sovereignty in that “one is entitled to absolute control of whatever is 
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within one’s domain however trivial it may be” (Feinberg, 1986: 55). No 
state power can be legitimately used to control this individual freedom.
Of course, it does not make sense to reject individual sovereignty 
outright. Yet, there arise problems if individuals remain 
overwhelmingly preoccupied with pursuing their private interests with 
little consideration for the negative consequences of their actions on the 
community at large. For instance, the American failure to deal with the 
problems of drugs and guns effectively may be seen as closely related 
to an overly individualistic interpretation of the concept of human 
rights. The question that follows is how then to prevent this kind of 
moral decay and nurture the value of community. It is normally at this 
point that a communitarian argument in sharp confrontation with 
liberalism is put forward, a position that asserts the need to defend the 
integrity of communities and the shared values characteristic of such 
communities. Those with a communitarian orientation may find it 
difficult to accept the liberal idea of individual sovereignty due to the 
fact that they would be more concerned about the negative social 
consequences of pursuing individual interests. In contrast, 
communitarians put forward the argument that the liberal version of 
human rights destroys community insofar as it fosters an extreme 
egocentric pursuit of interests. One case in point is pornography, which 
may not harm others but is argued to be morally corrupt or debased. 
These communitarians would welcome individual sovereignty insofar as 
the concomitant rights are instrumental for promoting a moral and 
ethical life, but such support for individual sovereignty would be 
withdrawn if these rights were to be used to promote the bad instead 
of the good. Simply put, “Individuals do not have the moral right to 
moral wrongdoing” (Chan, 1999: 232). 
Such communitarian arguments may sound more appropriate to East 
Asian contexts where the liberal tradition is lacking whilst excessive 
individualism as a cause of moral decay in the community is felt 
strongly. Likewise with the case of materialism, which tends to 
accompany crony capitalistic development. To make a critique of 
paradoxical modernity from a communitarian standpoint, however, 
involves intrinsic ambiguities and difficulties. Upon closer scrutiny, we 
come up against the key question of who is in the legitimate position 
to decide and safeguard the well-being of the community, and the 
methods that may be used to do so. For instance, liberals would either 
oppose or at least raise strong doubts when any individual or group 
states that he or she is entitled to define collective well-being and/or 
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national interests, for the good reason that this kind of claim may 
quickly lead to an authoritarian leadership which prefers order and 
stability (Donnelly, 1999). Thus, we should ask as sharply as possible 
which kind of communitarian alternative we wish to defend in our 
effort to go beyond Western modernity.
To cut a long story short, I think it possible to outline two types of 
communitarian approach to paradoxical modernity. One is 
authoritarian, and the other is basically participatory. The authoritarian 
model is characterized by an institutional solution in which the role of 
the state or the political leadership is decisive in defining collective 
interests. Chua’s point is penetrating in this respect:
Central to communitarianism is the idea that collective interests are 
placed above individual ones. Logically, what constitute the collective 
interests should be based on ‘consensus.’ However, as suggested 
earlier, the technical difficulties of soliciting opinions from every 
interested and affected party tends to be resolved, in practice, by a 
conflation of state/society, in which the elected political leadership 
assumes the position of defining both the consensus and the national 
interests by fiat (Chua, 1995: 191). 
We should not presuppose, however, that all communitarian 
approaches are logically geared to an authoritarian style of government 
and leadership. On the contrary, it is possible to explore a 
participation-oriented pathway to communitarianism, one that is 
significantly different from the road that leads us to authoritarianism 
and paternalism. Of crucial importance in this regard is the question of 
whether there is any method within the proposed communitarian 
alternative by which we can get out of the danger of a rationalized and 
centralized state power, which is assumed to be central to the 
authoritarian pathway. 
SINGAPORE AS A COMMUNITARIAN ALTERNATIVE?  
    
Probably, the best example of the communitarian road to 
authoritarian government today may be found in Singapore. In his 
keynote address at the Create 21 Asahi Forum on November 20, 1992, 
for instance, Lee Kwan Yew (1997: 380) pointed out three pathologies 
of American modernity which include: 1) a law and order out of 
control, leading to riots, drugs, guns, muggings, rape and other crimes, 
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2) poverty in the midst of great wealth, 3) excessive rights of the 
individual at the expense of the community as a whole. Explaining why 
the US has been unable to deal effectively with a particularly sensitive 
problem, namely drugs, he proudly declared that Singapore has been 
able to contain its drug problems owing to “Asian values.” “To protect 
the community,” said Lee (1997: 380), “we have passed laws which 
entitle police, drug enforcement or immigration officers to have the 
urine of any person who behaves in a suspicious way tested for drugs. 
If the result is positive, treatment is compulsory.” In the U.S., however, 
Such a law will be unconstitutional, because it will be an invasion 
of privacy of the individual. Any urine test would lead to a suit for 
damage for battery and assault and invasion of privacy.... So in the 
US the community’s interests have been sacrificed because of the 
human rights of drug traffickers and drug consumers. Drug-related 
crimes flourish. Schools are infected. There is high delinquency and 
violence amongst students, a high dropout rate, poor discipline and 
teaching, producing students who make poor workers. So a vicious 
cycle has set in (Lee, 1997: 381).
 
Indeed, Singapore presents an interesting example of a communitarian 
response to the pathological consequences and risks of Western 
modernity. Certain Confucian ethics have been selectively used (Tu, 
1984; Kuo, 1996) to establish a clean society and a corruption-free 
government that protects the interests of the community. Beginning 
with the premise that what people want is good government, Lee 
argues that good government depends on the values of a people, which 
assumes that Asian values are different from American or Western 
values. “As an Asian of Chinese cultural background, my values are for 
a government which is honest, effective and efficient in protecting its 
people, and allowing opportunities for all to advance themselves in a 
stable and orderly society where they can live a good life and raise their 
children to do better than themselves” (Lee, 1997: 380). He then listed 
seven requirements for good government as follows: 1) people are well 
cared for, in terms of their food, housing, employment, and health; 2) 
there is order and justice under the rule of law, and not the capricious 
arbitrariness of individual rulers; 3) as much personal freedom as 
possible but without infringing on the freedom of others; 4) growth in 
the economy and progress in society; 5) good and ever improving 
education; 6) high moral standards of rulers and of the people; 7) good 
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physical infrastructure, facilities for recreation, music, culture and arts; 
spiritual and religious freedoms, and a full intellectual life.  
Here we find a communitarian path to another modernity 
characterized by the expanded role of the state and benevolent 
leadership ready to intervene into the political, socio-economic, and 
cultural affairs to protect the collective interests of the community. 
Human rights are not flatly rejected. Rather, the step-by-step 
incremental approach is recommended with heavy emphasis on 
community interests as the state conceives of them. In addition, a 
process of consultation among diverse interest groups is created to 
secure social consensus. However, in our view this path of 
communitarian development is actually more likely to lead to 
paternalistic authoritarianism than democracy in the participatory sense 
(Chua, 1995). 
WHY DO WE NEED A NEO-COMMUNITARIAN APPROACH?
In opposition to the authoritarian version of the communitarian 
approach I examined above, I would like to explore another possible 
solution to the problem of Western modernity, namely a participatory 
form of the communitarian approach. This approach relies on neither 
the primacy of the role of markets (as in neo-liberalism), nor the 
primacy of the state (as in models of governance-based 
communitarianism). Nor does it lead to absolute relativism either. 
Rather, such an alternative conception of communitarianism 
presupposes and fosters the role of civil society in which diverse, 
grassroots-oriented, bottom-up trends of participation emerge and 
expand. In other words, according to our conception, the principal axis 
through which we might attempt to overcome the profoundly 
paradoxical nature of modernity is neither the market nor the state, but 
civil society and participatory movements as the engine of a 
distinctively communitarian approach. I call this pathway “neo- 
communitarian” in the sense that its characteristics differ from classic 
communalism on the one hand, and from the semi-authoritarian version 
of communitarianism referred to above on the other. 
To move away from the increasing philosophical and theoretical tone 
of our discussion, let me continue to elaborate our neo-communitarian 
approach through exemplifications. Let us turn firstly to the World-Cup 
street cheering in June 2002, and examine the implications that it holds 
for the Korean people and society. I can say with confidence that I 
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joined the street cheering at the Gwanghwamun area in Seoul every time 
a match involving the Korean team took place, wearing a red shirt and 
a red turban, and I personally witnessed how a new communitarian 
sense of cohesion and solidarity emerged from the people 
spontaneously for the first time in the history of Korea. For instance, 
even when the street was packed with hundreds of thousands of 
supporters, there was no sign of serious trouble or disorder. After the 
game was over, people willingly helped cleaning the streets. I was 
surprised to see such a large crowd gather together to cheer their team 
without making any collective incident tainted with violence or 
criminality.
Based on these observations, I wrote an essay in the Korea Times on 
July 5th, 2002. Let me cite the pages wherein one can see what I mean 
by a neo-communitarian culture.
The most valuable asset we have gotten from the World Cup is the 
experience of sharing together and a sense of belonging as Koreans 
whilst at the same time overcoming the barriers of age, sex, class, and 
region. In a red wave flowing across the grand plaza, we became one, 
shouting the soul-stirring slogan of “Dae~han-min-guk.” 
Another asset is the forward-looking value orientation of our 
younger generation. By the street cheering, they proved that the 
worries of their elders were wrong. They were no longer an 
impudent new generation who dye their hair yellow or spend the 
entire night pounding on computer keyboards. Instead, they drape 
the national flags around their necks and bodies, and even make 
shirts or skirts with them. The Taeguk flag is no longer an ornament 
for national holidays. Our young people are full of youthful vigor 
and know how to rejoice in a festival. But at the same time they do 
not lose self-control or a sense of order. In their bright faces, we can 
see the future of this nation. In their pure passion, we can find the 
possibility of a new communitarian culture. The strong collective 
ethos of the Korean people has been fully displayed. 
The final asset that we have gained is our national confidence and 
dignity .... Since the time of Japanese colonial rule, we Koreans have 
been used to denying and distrusting ourselves. Over the course of 
hard struggles with foreign invasions, dictatorial rule and age-long 
poverty, we have developed our national traits of patience and 
self-defense. But we could not afford to enjoy self-realization in a 
positive sense. Such negative realization has had a negative influence 
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on our national competitiveness. In this respect, the 2002 FIFA World 
Cup served as an occasion for us to wipe away such self-destructive 
legacies and regain our confidence and dignity as a nation. 
We are proud of no longer suffering from poverty, dictatorship or 
foreign invasions. This country is now leaping into the rank of 
advanced nations, outpacing western countries in many aspects. 
However, we must remember that what strengthens our national 
solidarity is not one-sided chauvinism but a genuine patriotism with 
which we can overcome authoritarianism, the cold-war mentality and 
class distinctions, thereby building a new nation and contributing to 
the promotion of human peace and well-being. 
In order to maintain our newly-inspired patriotism and solidarity, 
all the leading elites of this society should pool their wisdom and 
take the initiative in making this nation a better place to live in. There 
are rising demands for the nation to further develop its politics, 
economy, society and culture in such a way as to gather our 
newly-found energy and utilize it in order to invest in building a 
positive future. 
If our leaders fail to read the minds of people, their leadership will 
be surely in peril. At this critical juncture, we should take account of 
the factors that impede the actualization of our national potential. The 
leaders of our society (especially politicians), who have been blamed 
for clinging to their own interests by exploiting regional and factional 
prejudices and their own personal connections, need to reflect on 
what they have done. They should learn from the younger 
generation. In order to meet the demands of people, they are required 
to transform themselves and realize their own obligations as leaders. 
Amid the heat of June, there was truth on the streets. It clearly 
showed that our society stands at a great turning point. The reward 
we got from the World Cup cannot be calculated in monetary value 
alone. For the first time in history, we are given the opportunity for 
serious self-reflection and dignity in collective joy and enthusiasm. 
There are, of course, important conditions that underlay these new 
developments, to which I will return later. What is suggested above, 
however, is that the surge of neo-communitarian solidarity led by 
younger generation was backed up by the IT revolution. Quite distant 
from the anachronistic chauvinism of the past, this new stream of youth 
can potentially develop an open-minded global attitude. In fact, the 
behavioral pattern of young people at present is individualistic in 
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nature and cynical about established forms of authority. While defying 
collectivism of the traditional variety, the youth nevertheless emerged as 
the core of national solidarity and the upcoming neo-communitarian 
culture. It is, therefore, necessary to pay careful attention to this new 
trend. 
The ground-breaking participatory form of communitarian culture 
began to manifest itself in Korea since 2000 when “the Citizens’ Alliance 
for the 2000 General Elections” (as an umbrella organization of NGOs), 
was formed and wielded great influence. This signaled an important 
change in the paradigm of governance. As an editorial in the Korea 
Times noted on April 16, 2000, “politics has remained by and large the 
exclusive business of parties and politicians. It was rather insignificant 
for the citizens to take meaningful part in politics. The idea of popular 
sovereignty has meant in all practical purposes nothing more than 
one-time voting rights of individuals during election time.” However, 
an important shift began to take place: 
This no longer appears to be the case. The emergence of the civil 
society sector has had a powerful impact upon our political process 
as to profoundly modify such a conventional governing paradigm. 
Certainly, politics in Korea is no longer a monopoly of parties and 
politicians. The parliamentary elections last week powerfully 
demonstrated that this new governing paradigm has set foot in our 
political system (Korea Times, April 16, 2000).  
Composed of about 600 individual NGO groups, the Citizens Alliance 
published a ‘blacklist’ of 86 candidates they concluded unfit to run for 
the National Assembly and waged aggressive campaigns through 
various media including the Internet. They collected all the information 
of candidates’ military service, tax payments, criminal records, and 
other public records and disclosed the hitherto unknown facts through 
the Internet. These campaigns were so successful that 59 of the 86 
candidates targeted lost, including several political heavyweights. This 
clearly indicates the increasing potentiality of participatory democracy 
in Korea. 
The success and influence of the civil society organizations in Korea 
today owes a great deal to the strong student movement during the 
1980’s, whose cultural origins can be traced back much earlier to the 
Confucian tradition of the public sphere from the sixteenth century (De 
Bary, 1991; Kim, 1994). This implies a close affinity between past and 
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present: as Confucian scholars (sonbi or sarim) formed a reform-oriented 
social force in the Choson dynasty only after several decades of 
Confucian education and campaigns. Similarly, civil society 
organizations, their value orientations, leadership as well as supportive 
constituency were made possible today only after several decades of 
strong popular social movements beginning in the 1960s. These 
developments in the realm of Korean civil society suggest the possibility 
of a communitarian approach towards development that is of a more 
participatory and deliberative nature than authoritarian one, for this 
reason differing substantially from the experience of Singapore.
The participatory pathway to cultural awakening through the 
World-Cup street cheering was soon linked to many on-line campaigns 
and candlelight marches, which in turn wielded significant political 
influence. In Korea, state power and the establishment have long 
colluded with each other to serve the vested interests of the powerful. 
Only as democratization has proceeded, have a few signs of change 
begun to be felt among the people and the political circles as well. Yet 
the democratically elected government represented only a minority 
government, and the reform efforts faced intransigent resistance from 
the powerful interests of the establishment, which mobilized their 
substantial resources to impede reform. This raises an important 
question of how to see the relationship between the formal and official 
circuits of power working at the level of the government on the one 
hand, and the informal and substantive circuit of power working 
through various connections to regional and ideological cleavages in 
support of the establishment, on the other. And it is precisely in this 
historical context that a neo-communitarian movement by the younger 
generation backed up by the Internet played a powerful role to control 
the hitherto privileged influence of the forces of the establishment. 
The presidential election in December 2002 was a good case in point. 
The young generation proved very capable of collective action in 
support of political reform, struggling against the conservative media, 
culture, and society. They organized nationwide on-line activities and 
astutely combined online and offline campaigns, a strategy which 
turned out to be very effective and almost cost-free. From November 
2002, furthermore, massive protest rallies continued to take place 
throughout Korea until just before the day of presidential election, 
demanding for a rewriting of the agreement governing the legal status 
of American troops in Korea (SOFA). Triggered by the acquittal by a 
U.S. military court of two American soldiers charged with the death of 
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two Korean female students, these rallies were initially led by young 
netizens but rapidly gained enthusiastic mass support all over the 
country cutting across differences of age, gender, class, and religion. On 
the Saturday night of December 14th, for instance, more than three 
hundred thousand Koreans rallied at no less than 57 locations across the 
nation, including the Seoul City Hall Plaza, holding votive candles and 
singing songs. They announced ‘the day of restoration of national 
sovereignty’, while demanding a fair and equal partnership between 
Korea and the U.S. These participatory civil moments with a 
communitarian orientation greatly aided in keeping the influence of the 
conservative media at bay. The current President Roh Moo-hyun’s 
victory, in fact, owed much to the voluntary participation of these 
young people and their effective campaigns for mobilization of the 
supports to the ballot box.
The democratizing effect of candlelight marches by the youth was 
demonstrated even more vividly by the general elections of April 2004. 
Since 1998 when the first transition of power from the ruling to the 
opposition power took place in Korea, democratically elected 
governments suffered a great deal from their minority position in the 
National Assembly. Against this background, the conservative 
opposition parties united to impeach the President for reasons that were 
perceived by the majority of the people to be politically motivated. The 
fact that the impeachment happened to coincide with a period when 
public investigations were under way to examine alleged widespread 
corruption within these parties further reinforced the perception that the 
conservative parties were to blame for the political confusion. 
Profoundly shocked by the National Assembly’s act of impeachment, 
the young people re-launched a series of candlelight marches once again 
to save the President and to protest against the National Assembly’s 
dictatorial power against the will of the people. The party associated 
with the president and holding office that time was nothing more than 
just a small minority party when the general elections took place. 
However, owing much to the support of the young people who were 
mobilized to a level equal to the presidential elections in 2002, the 
ruling party finally won more than half the seats in the national 
assembly. In this way, the candlelight march (as a symbol of a 
pro-democratic communitarian movement) paved the road to escape 
from entrenched authoritarian influences and the oppressive legacy of 
the establishment on civil society, at the same time as enabling the 
people to move beyond entrenched Cold-War mentalities and 
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ideological polarization.
The traditional form of communitarianism with its authoritarian 
(hierarchical) inclinations, when applied to the problem of paradoxical 
modernity, may give rise to, at best, an efficient administration with 
benevolent leadership and the expanded capacity of the state for 
top-down intervention. One might easily advocate this position in the 
name of Asian values or Asian traditions. In contrast, the 
neo-communitarian approach outlined above with its participatory 
(discursive) orientation casts new light on the reciprocal relationship 
between structures of governance and the citizens’ power of 
deliberation, as the key condition for overcoming the problematique 
thrown up by paradoxical modernity. Here the focus is on bottom-up 
communication emerging from the sphere of civil society. Incidentally 
one could advocate this neo-communitarian position on the basis of a 
strong indigenous grounding, being able to make an equal claim to 
being rooted in authentic Asian traditions and philosophies as the more 
traditional interpretation of communitarianism. According to the 
neo-communitarian response to the question of paradoxical modernity, 
the source of imagination for our future lies primarily in the arena of 
citizens’ participation and deliberation, not in sole dependence on either 
the market and/or the state.
SOCIO-CULTURAL BASIS OF A NEO-COMMUNITARIAN ALTERNATIVE 
So far I have discussed ten salient aspects of paradoxical modernity 
and three possible pathways that outline alternatives or resolutions to 
its ambivalences, and I finally argued the case for why we need a 
neo-communitarian alternative. To substantiate this point, I examined 
the debate between liberalism and communitarianism in the West and 
argued that, although there are good reasons for us in East Asia to 
advocate a communitarian approach, there are inherent dangers to be 
avoided: the traditionally close link in our region between the 
communitarian critique to Western modernity and authoritarian 
leadership and state power, as can be seen in the case of Singapore. I 
moved further to explore the reasons why we need to develop a 
neo-communitarian approach, and made use of some examples from 
recent Korean experiences, such as the World-Cup street cheering and 
the candlelight marches, in order to clarify the ways in which the 
neo-communitarian approach differs from the more widely known form 
of communitarianism with authoritarian inclinations. Finally, the issue 
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of national identity and democratization was examined from the point 
of view of overall historical developments, from which vantage point 
we noted that the pro-democratic candlelight marches should be seen as 
a concrete case of neo-communitarianism in Korea.   
In what follows, I would like to take a more detailed look at the 
socio-cultural bases of the neo-communitarian approach, which include 
1) the formation of pro-democratic, participation-oriented societal forces, 
2) the development of the internet as an alternative public sphere, and 
3) the subjection of taken-for-granted assumptions to the validation of 
a post-conventional examination, a cultural process deeply influenced 
by the waves of globalization.
Each of these points has something to do with different dimensions 
of the neo-communitarian alternative. It must be stressed, however, that 
all communitarian movements, whether new or old, view human beings 
not as isolated individuals but as members of a community, and hence 
these movements should be seen as a collective actor promoting the 
achievement of 1) agency and solidarity within itself and between other 
groups as well, 2) a specific cultural mode of strengthening the shared 
identity of community, and 3) the extension of the concrete means of 
communication available in a society. Different combinations of these 
goals may bring about different historical types of communitarian 
approach. Having said so, I would like to examine these three 
conditions in the context of Korea, which will allow us to 
comprehensively understand the meaning of the neo-communitarian 
alternative. I will examine the first point in detail and touch upon the 
remaining two only briefly.
Concerning the question of agency touched on by the first point, I 
would like to pay attention to the characteristics of those who have 
been called the “386 generation” in Korea, that is, those in the 30-40 age 
bracket who entered college in the 1980s and who were born in the 
1960s. Today this age-bracket has become the mainstay of the society, 
leading the IT-related industries as well as many other areas. Through 
devotion and struggle, this generational grouping has been the initiators 
of the nation’s democratization in the 1980s and 1990s, and they have 
consequently laid the solid foundations for a tradition of civic 
participation. In-depth analyses of this generational grouping reveal a 
lot of interesting details (Han, 2001). First, as they grew up and reached 
maturity in the midst of a culture of political protest in the 1980s, they 
have maintained and shared a collective identity as a reform-oriented 
social force even after their maturation during adulthood. Second, the 
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386 generation understand themselves as part of the “People” or the 
“Grassroots,” rather than as part of the Establishment. Third, they tend 
to understand history and society critically from the point of view of 
their keen attention to the rights and welfare of the common people, 
rather than merely acquiescing to the monopolization of historical and 
social process by a handful of power elites looking after their narrow 
interests. Fourth, they are able to better understand (through their broad 
social vision) the difficult situation facing such social minorities as 
women, foreign laborers, the handicapped, the poor, the incarcerated, 
homosexuals, North Korean defectors, and those stigmatized by being 
labeled ideologically dangerous such as those on the political left. The 
386 generation try their best to embrace these various minorities instead 
of simply excluding them. Fifth, they are able to maintain a sense of 
their national sovereignty in contrast to adopting subservient attitudes 
toward powerful states. Sixth, they show their support and respect to 
leaders who would rather live up to principles than surrender to 
unjustifiable and unacceptable compromises. Finally, they are in favor 
of structural reforms in accordance with global standards, rather than 
clinging to parochialism and uninformed nationalist preoccupations.
An interesting hypothesis in this regard concerns the formation of a 
distinctive social force, which I have named the “middling grassroots” 
(jungmin) by which I mean those who understand themselves as part of 
the middle class whilst at the same time identifying themselves as 
“People” and/or “Grassroots.” The “386 generation” referred to above 
would constitute the rational core of the middling grassroots. This 
specific segment of the middle class in Korea can be seen as an outcome 
of the unique Korean pathway of economic development that has 
occurred concurrently with the development of the student movement 
since the 1960s (Han, 1997). It is no accident that the student activists 
of the 1980s are today most active in defending public interests through 
NGO activities, at the same time as they are powering ahead in 
developing IT-related venture firms. It is perhaps due to the 386 
generation’s disillusionment with the state of party politics and the 
mass media today, that they seem to be very enthusiastic in developing 
the Internet as an alternative forum for discussion.
One outcome of compressed modernization in Korea is the existence 
of marked differences between different generations, and in this sense 
the middling grassroots and the 386 generation are differentiated quite 
visibly from the conservative segment of the middle class (largely in 
their late forties to sixties). The latter have shared the experience of 
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absolute poverty in their childhood, and have thus been strongly driven 
to dig themselves out of a situation of material deprivation by any 
means. Equipped with high energy and motivation with this goal in 
mind, they have been the major carriers of rapid industrial 
modernization. Therefore, this older generation has been largely 
preoccupied with materialistic values, being eager for upward mobility. 
With a strong concern to maintain the status quo of economic 
development, they preferred political order and stability rather than 
change, whilst subjecting themselves to an authoritarian rule which they 
took for granted. What makes the middling grassroots distinctive in this 
regard is the fact that they have continued to maintain their reformist 
identities even after their entry into mainstream social institutions. They 
have remained critical of the authoritarian aspects of politics and 
society, while being predisposed to support political reforms and 
reconciliation with repressed others. Since they have enjoyed a 
childhood relatively free from poverty, it is natural for them to prefer 
such values as self-expression and participation.
The reason why we can see these people as being the major actor 
capable of pursuing the neo-communitarian approach is two-fold. 
Firstly, they share a common identity, a sense of mutual empathy and 
belonging. Thus, they are psychologically predisposed to join, or at least 
to support the various movements for participation initiated by their 
members, neither through the force of any formal organization or 
collective interests, but purely through a calling emanating from a 
shared sense of identity. In this sense, we might say that they are 
embedded within a neo-communitarian culture the extent of whose 
impact may nevertheless differ from one section of the group to 
another. Secondly, this generation is far better placed than any others 
to understand the problems of socially marginalized people, minorities, 
the poor, and so on, and thus are capable of constructing an inclusive 
community with extended solidarity. Let us examine the 
self-understanding of the 386 generation on the basis of results from a 
recent survey.1     
1 These data were collected from the students who had taken my class ‘Introduction 
to Sociology’ at Seoul National University from 1981 to 1989. Each semester I gave the 
students an assignment of preparing one’s own biographical analysis by focusing on the 
conflicts and strains imbued in the transition from the stage of conventional morality to 
that of a post-conventional one. The reports collected were about two thousand and four 
hundred altogether. As of 1999 when the first longitudinal research started, only half of 
them were identified of their current addresses and workplaces. Thus, an intensive 
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TABLE 1. SELF-UNDERSTANDING OF 386 GENERATION
The self-image depicted in Table 1 clearly indicates that the members 
of the 386 generation have developed a strong sense of identity, being 
quite conscious of their own potentials and limitations. An absolute 
majority of respondents admit to being critical of the Establishment. 
questionnaire was sent to them together with a copy of their reports written in the 1980s. 
Of 1200 samples for a longitudinal analysis, about 650 returned the questionnaire.
Questions Agree(%)
The members of the 386 generation are highly critical of their established 
surroundings
90.9%
The 386 generation suffer from a tendency to bestow too much 
“meaning” on everything: they are too ideologically conscious
75.8%
The 386 generation are more sympathetic to and understanding of 
marginal groups than any other generation.
75.2%
The 386 generation feel they live somehow “in debt” to the ‘minjung’ or 
the common working-class people
73.8%
There exists a close sense of identity and of deep solidarity among the 
members of the 386 generation.
72.7%
The 386 generation are more rational in their thinking and more 
democratic in orientation than any other generation.
63.7%
The 386 generation draw a clear distinction between good and evil, friend 
and foe.
54.3%
The 386 generation do not discriminate against or dislike others on the 
basis of differences of opinion.
51.9%
The 386 generation lack specialization of knowledge as compared with 
those who are currently in their 20’s.
45.3%
The 386 generation are relatively free from “geographic and academic 
favouritism.” (bestowing favours on those from the same geographical 
origin or academic background as oneself.)
42.9%
The 386 generation is an unfortunate generation unable to realize its 
ideals and dreams
42.3%
Currently the 386 generation value the individual more than the group. 39.6%
The members of the 386 generation are hypocritical. 33.4%
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They admit that they are more inclined to identify with ordinary people 
than with the ruling elites, enabling them to nurture a sympathetic 
understanding of, and solidarity with the plight of repressed minorities. 
At the same time, three out of four admit that they are conscious of 
being too ideologically biased. In addition, more than half of them 
admit that they are still not free from the clutches of regional and/or 
educational favoritism.  
The second socio-cultural basis for the neo-communitarian approach 
concerns developments in the technological dimension of communication. 
What attracts our attention first is the explosive increase in the number 
of internet subscribers and its widespread use. In 1999, the number of 
internet subscribers was merely 3.7 million, but this number had soared 
up to some 4 million by 2000, 7.8 million by 2001, and 10 million by 
October 2002. By the end of 2001, Korea stood at the world’s top in 
terms of its internet subscription (with a rate of 17.2 per 100 people), 
followed by Canada (8.4%) and Sweden (5.0%). At present, Korean 
users spend more time on the internet than their counterparts in any 
other country. Furthermore, the increase in Internet use from October 
1999 to December 2001 was explosive from 33.6 percent to 93.3 percent 
in the age group from 7 to 19; from 41.9 percent to 84.6 percent among 
people in their twenties; and from 18.5 percent to 61.6 percent among 
people in their thirties. As of December 2001, 88.4 percent of elementary 
pupils, 99.8 percent of middle school students, 99.0 percent of high 
school students, and 99.3 percent of college students are using the 
Internet. The impact of the Internet on society at large cannot be 
underestimated.
In this regard, care must be taken to take note of the similarities and 
differences between those in their thirties (who facilitated the nation’s 
democratization) and the succeeding digital generation. One might 
define the former as a ‘politicized, social-movement generation’ and the 
latter as a ‘relatively conservative depoliticized generation.’ Others 
might say that the former catalyzed the political eruption of the June 
uprising in 1987, while the latter created the “cultural eruption of the 
2002 World Cup.” Despite so many empirical differences, however, 
these two groups share one important common characteristic, that is, an 
underlying motivation to escape from the constraints of the established 
order and its norms. In other words, those in their thirties have 
spearheaded the struggle against the military dictatorship while the 
succeeding digital generation is in the midst of attempting to critically 
verify a variety of moral and cultural issues through their daily lives. 
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On the surface, the former seems to be collectivistic and ideologically 
oriented whilst the latter appear to be highly individualized. But both 
of them share a post-conventional way of thinking and, as a 
consequence, are strongly motivated to critically re-examine through 
experience their own taken-for-granted assumptions.
Does the Internet foster a participation-oriented communitarian 
culture? It can be argued that the Internet does indeed make possible 
a new form of direct democracy by opening up a space for two-way 
debates. Given the fact that democracy is founded on the free 
acquisition and verification of information by which citizens can make 
their own decisions, horizontal exchange and free access to information 
through the Internet and the ensuing political participation that it makes 
possible is sure to promote and facilitate democracy. In particular, 
issues excluded from the major agenda-setting political process for 
certain reasons can be actively raised on the Internet. Many instances 
can be cited of this having occurred in the Korean context.
But the communitarian implications of the Internet need further 
specification, as the on-line campaigns differ significantly from off-line 
organization. One may argue that the Internet actually promotes 
egocentric behavior without consideration for others, as may be the case 
with e-shopping, e-banking, e-gambling, internet pornography, and so 
on. But when and where the Internet provides alternative public spheres 
working effectively, a countless number of people voluntarily 
participate in on-line hearings and debates while seeking the 
information that they need. They are free to communicate with each 
other. Entry and Exit is totally open and free of obligations. While 
dealing with a specific topic on an issue site, on-line alternative 
communities are built which presuppose neither a fixed identity nor 
consistent organizational behavior. Instead, the flow of communication 
continually moves back and forth, forming an ever-changing on-line 
public opinion and encouraging voluntary participation. On-line 
communities of this kind are flourishing everywhere in Korea cutting 
across regional, class, generational, and educational boundaries. In 
short, the on-line community fostered by the Internet is more based on 
individual choices and decisions than off-line organizations, is more 
voluntaristic than mobilized, more flexible than fixed. Thus, we can 
conclude from all this that the Internet fosters a participation-oriented 
communitarian culture, especially when the leading force of the Internet 
culture is one firmly committed to the progress of democratization.
The third background condition for the neo-communitarian alternative 
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is related to a post-conventional re-examination of societal norms, which 
presupposes the increase of a reflexive attitude. Traditions then can 
never be simply taken for granted, due to the fact that they persist only 
“in so far as they are made available to discursive justification and are 
prepared to enter into open dialogue not only with other traditions but 
with alternative modes of doing things” (Giddens, 1995: 105). In this 
context, Giddens speaks of the “post-traditional society” as “the first 
global society.”
A post-traditional society is not a national society ― we are 
speaking here of a global cosmopolitan order. Nor is it a society in 
which traditions cease to exist; in many respects there are impulses, 
or pressures, towards the sustaining or the recovery of traditions. It 
is a society, however, in which tradition changes its status. In the 
context of a globalizing, cosmopolitan order, traditions are constantly 
brought into contact with one another and forced to ‘declare 
themselves’ (Giddens, 1995: 83).
The ability to verify accepted norms and values through a 
post-conventional re-examination implies the possibility of 
deconstructing some taken-for-granted assumptions whilst at the same 
time reconstructing some other long abandoned or un-popular traits 
with normative validity. The proper way to assess the significance of 
Confucianism in East Asia is a good case in point. In Korea, for 
example, empirical research shows that the young people are disposed 
to be far more critical than the older generations over the control- 
oriented (authoritarian) aspects of Confucianism, whereas they are more 
in favor of the humanistic tenets. This implies that the young people are 
neither totally rejecting nor accepting in an uncritical and conventional 
manner the Confucian heritage as a whole, but are drawing selectively 
from the pool of inherited wisdom with the benefit of a global 
perspective. This also means that the emergent neo-communitarian 
alternative is not synonymous with the old style of nationalism and 
ethno-centrism, but is an entirely new kind of phenomenon in which an 
individual choice is harmonized in an organic unity with the principles 
of collective solidarity. 
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